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Special Issue on the Coronavirus Pandemic’s Economic Efects 
This special digital-only issue features four proposals from Upjohn research staf that focus on 
some of the sobering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. economy. Some parts of these 
proposals were incorporated into the already-enacted CARES Act. Others merit inclusion in ensuing 
emergency legislation. Also included are summaries of and links to additional proposals aimed at 
alleviating a variety of related difculties facing workers and their families at this time. 
Coronavirus and the Economy
Repurposing Production, Helping the Needy, Saving Businesses,














What Is the Likely 







and Encouraging Job Preservation 
Timothy J. Bartik and Brad J. Hershbein 
Te current coronavirus pandemic is likely 
not only to cause many deaths and acute health 
problems, but also to seriously limit the ability of 
many people to work and make ends meet. What 
can be done to help alleviate this damage? 
We are economists, not public health experts, 
so we focus on what we can do to mobilize the 
economy to deal with this crisis, and leave the 
needed public health measures to others. But let’s 
outline a few economic responses that are needed. 
1) Mobilize the economy to produce more 
health system capacity. On an emergency basis, the 
capacity of our health systems must be expanded 
to treat more patients. We need to ask public 
health experts what is needed, and use emergency, 
wartime-equivalent powers to get factories to 
produce what is needed. Many public health 
experts, for example, suggest we will need more 
ventilators to help treat severe cases of coronavirus. 
What factories could be quickly repurposed to
produce more ventilators? Te federal government 
needs to order this to be done, and pay for it, just 
as the government mobilized Detroit to produce 
planes during World War II. Do we need more 
hospital capacity? Te Army helped set up Civilian 
Conservation Corps camps quite quickly during 
the Great Depression; we will likely need some tent 
hospitals, drive-through testing, and possibly even 
quick conversions of vacant buildings. Military 
and VA health care workers may be needed to staf 
these additional facilities. 
2) Compensate the unemployed without 
conditions. We need to pay unemployment benefts 
to all the unemployed, even those who aren’t 
normally eligible for unemployment insurance. 
Our colleagues Chris O’Leary and Steve Wandner 
We need to use emergency, wartime-
equivalent powers to get factories to
produce what is needed. 
have put together a proposal on how this could 
be done, including how to reach independent 
contractors, self-employed workers, and others 
not covered by unemployment insurance. We 
should also inform and encourage employers to 
adopt short-time compensation, as suggested by 
our colleagues Katharine Abraham and Susan 
Houseman, allowing businesses to reduce workers’ 
hours without laying them of, while workers could 
still collect partial unemployment benefts. We 
have a fexible unemployment benefts system; let’s 
use it to full efect. 
3) Bail out businesses for losses from the 
pandemic, but impose more stringent conditions 
on larger businesses. Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel 
Zucman have proposed government grants to 
pay for the maintenance costs of businesses— 
from payroll to rent to interest on debt—that are 
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Coronavirus and the Economy 
prefer open lines of credit—at the 
government’s long-term borrowing 
rate, roughly 1 percent—to businesses 
with fewer than 500 employees. Tese 
smaller businesses, encompassing 
about 60 percent of workers, are the 
ones most likely to sufer cash fow 
problems and be at greater risk of 
liquidation without support. Any loans 
from these lines of credit should have 
repayments deferred for 2 years, and 
another 20 years over which to repay 
The fow of aid to state and local
governments should increase
if the recession gets worse,
and it should be targeted toward
the most afected areas. 
the loans. For larger businesses, lines of 
credit could also be an option, but any 
additional measures, such as the fat-
out bailouts sought by airlines, should 
come with conditions on maintaining 
payroll and rehiring, and possibly 
a government equity stake, as was 
done with the auto industry bailout 
during the Great Recession. For large 
businesses, we need to send a signal 
that government’s implicit guarantees 
come with some cost. 
4) Basic income payments to all 
immediately, as a way of alleviating 
economic distress and setting the 
stage for a recovery. Jason Furman
and Claudia Sahm have proposed 
immediate cash payments of at least 
$1,000 or more per household. Tis 
would help alleviate economic distress: 
people could pay their rent or buy 
food. Yes, sending a check to everyone 
makes for poor targeting, giving money 
to many who don’t (yet) need it. But it’s 
simple and fast. To better target funds 
to those most likely to need them, the 
U.S. Treasury could send checks to
tax flers with adjusted gross incomes 
below some amount, say $50,000, 
as well as those who did not fle a 
tax return. Such monies would help 
people avoid eviction, repossession of 
a car, or forgoing food and medicine. 
Depending on how bad economic 
conditions get, these payments could 
be repeated, based on automatic 
unemployment rate triggers. 
5) Incentivize job preservation and 
job creation. Beginning immediately, 
and at least through 2021, provide a 
15 percent payroll tax credit on FTE 
employees above 90 percent of the 
business’s precrisis FTE employment 
level. Tis credit would go to any 
employer with employees: for-
proft, nonproft, and state and local 
governments. Te goal: encourage 
employers to “go frst” in hiring, and 
take a risk. Will some of this money 
go to hospitals likely to expand during 
the crisis anyway? Yes—and they’ll 
need it to pay for additional equipment 
and overtime for staf. For most other 
businesses, the incentives may help 
retain—and rehire—workers. We 
want to make the recovery from this 
recession rapid rather than gradual, 
and part of that involves encouraging 
employment expansion. 
6) Federal aid to hard-hit state and 
local governments through revenue 
sharing. During a recession, state 
and local tax revenue decline while 
the need for state and local public 
spending rises. Tese fscal pressures 
will be particularly acute in areas with 
heavy concentration in industries 
already afected by the current crisis. 
Such areas include those that depend 
greatly on tourism, travel, or energy. 
Tese areas, despite being at risk 
of sufering the greatest economic 
consequences, will be the least able to 
adequately respond. Because state and 
local governments must balance their 
budgets, fscal pressures will likely 
lead to cutbacks in spending, making 
any recession worse. Te federal 
government should help by providing 
revenue to state and local governments. 
During the Great Recession, for 
example, such assistance peaked at over 
$100 billion. A variety of options exist 
for providing aid, including adjusting 
Medicaid reimbursement rates or 
increasing block grants. Te fow of aid 
should be structured to increase if the 
recession gets worse, and it should be 
targeted toward the most afected areas. 
Is this all that is needed? Probably 
not! We will need to adjust policies as 
public health and economic conditions 
change. Now is the time for the 
government to be bold and quick on its 
feet. We must all be open to new ideas 
as events unfold. 
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.
Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist and director
of information and communications services at the
Upjohn Institute. 
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Stephen A. Wandner and Christopher J. O’Leary 
Te COVID-19 virus is likely to 
cause major disruptions in U.S. labor 
markets for at least 18 months—until 
a vaccine is developed and widely 
administered. Any program to help 
afected workers and stimulate the U.S. 
economy should be carefully targeted 
to workers who are most in need of 
income support and most likely to 
quickly spend these funds in the local 
economy. 
Four groups of workers will most 
likely sufer severe problems during the 
COVID-19 crisis: 
• Sick individuals whose jobs do 
not provide sick leave or sufcient 
sick leave. 
• Unemployed workers who are 
covered by unemployment 
insurance (UI) but are deemed 
ineligible because they do not 
satisfy the requirements for being 
able to, being available for, and 
actively seeking work, among 
other eligibility requirements. 
• Unemployed workers who receive 
UI benefts but have exhausted 
their regular UI benefts. 
• Workers not covered by the UI 
program, including the self-
employed, contract employees, 
and, more generally, “gig workers.” 
Tese groups may all sufer earnings 
losses because of illness, public health 
requirements for social distancing 
from coworkers or customers during 
the crisis, and declines in economic 
demand for the products and services 
they provide. Tey may lose labor 
income, be ineligible for UI, or 
exhaust their benefts. Unless they 
have substantial savings, they will be 
unable to pay for basic needs—food, 
rent, medical care, car payments—for 
themselves and their families. Teir 
decreased spending will also harm 
their local economies. 
Proposal 
We propose changes to UI 
programs to provide income to covered 
unemployed workers, to workers still 
technically employed but without sick 
leave, and to those unemployed but 
not covered by UI. Specifcally, two 
packages of UI initiatives should be 
undertaken, with each limited to an 
18-month time frame. 
COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance 
Program Refnements 
• Access to benefts: States should 
simplify the UI application 
process and provide telephone 
support to UI applicants who 
have difculty applying for 
benefts. 
• Able and available: Workers 
sufering from COVID-19 or in 
a required recovery quarantine 
should have the “able and 
available” work requirements to 
receive UI waived. 
• Actively seeking work: 
Unemployed workers from jobs 
that do not permit sufcient 
social distancing from coworkers 
and customers should have UI’s 
work search requirements lifed. 
Workers allowed to telecommute 
must continue to work. 
• Beneft standards: All states 
should be required to ofer 
benefts for a potential duration 
of at least 26 weeks, and the 
maximum weekly beneft amount 
should be two-thirds of the 
average weekly wage among UI-
covered workers in that state. 
• Administration: Te federal 
government should substantially 
increase grants to states to 
pay for the administration 
of state UI programs, as well 
as a new COVID-19 Special 
Unemployment Assistance 
program (see below). 
• Temporary emergency 
compensation: A temporary 
emergency compensation 
program extending the duration 
of benefts for 26 weeks should 
be made available to all UI 
recipients, in all states, regardless 
of the unemployment rate. It 
should be enacted by Congress 
and paid for from federal general 
revenue. 
• Permanent extended benefts: 
Extended benefts should be 
federalized and paid from 
federal general revenue. Tis 
would provide up to 13 weeks of 
additional UI benefts when the 
state total unemployment rate is 




During the severe 1974–1975 
recession, Congress enacted a Special 
Unemployment Assistance (SUA) 
program that paid benefts to workers 
not covered by the regular UI program. 
Te program was temporary and 
paid with federal general revenue. 
A similar temporary program could 
be created to pay unemployment 
assistance to workers who become sick 
from COVID-19 or have been laid of 
because they were employed in jobs 
that prevent social distancing and 
either 1) don’t have or have exhausted 
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An Unemployment Insurance
COVID-19 Crisis Response 
unemployed and work in uncovered 
employment. SUA benefts would 
• be payable to self-employed, 
contract, and gig economy 
workers; 
• be payable for up to 52 weeks; 
• be paid using state beneft 
formulas but with crisis 
enhancements to amounts and 
durations listed above; 
• determine monetary eligibility 
by payroll or tax fling records; 
• waive “able, available, and 
actively seeking work” 
requirements as described 
above; 
• ensure beneft access by having 
state UI staf assist with the SUA 
application, whether this be a 
new process or adapted from 
the Disaster Unemployment 
Assistance program. 
Te temporary UI program 
refnements and COVID-19 SUA 
program would together provide 
income support to the great majority 
of workers adversely afected by the 
COVID-19 economic shock. State 
UI programs across the country 
are uniquely suited to enroll new 
participants in income transfer 
payment programs, process weekly 
or biweekly cash payments, and 
rapidly establish programs in times 
of emergencies. State UI agencies 
have experience with Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance, the 9/11 
airline unemployment assistance 
program, and temporary emergency 
compensation programs during 
recessions. 
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute. 




Assistance Would Help Gig,
Contract, Self-Employed
Workers Afected by COVID-19 
Stephen A. Woodbury 
Many, perhaps most, workers who 
have lost their jobs as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic will be eligible 
to receive regular state unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefts for up to 26 
weeks. But many other job losers who 
have a strong attachment to the labor 
force and depend on their earnings— 
self-employed workers, contract 
workers, gig workers, and others—are 
ineligible for UI because they have not 
been on the payroll of an employer who 
has paid UI taxes on their earnings. 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance 
(DUA) would make these self-
employed workers, contract workers, 
and gig workers eligible to receive UI 
benefts. It is almost certainly the most 
efective fscal policy tool available to 
the federal government to quickly blunt 
the economic damage resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
DUA is normally paid to workers 
who lose their jobs, but do not qualify 
for regular UI benefts, following 
natural disasters such as hurricanes, 
foods, tornadoes, and geological 
disasters like earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions. Te program is initiated by 
a presidential disaster declaration and 
administered by the state UI agencies, 
which in turn are overseen by the U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
DUA requires no new congressional 
legislation—it is authorized by 
the Staford Act of 1988—and the 
administrative structure needed to 
make it run already exists. Because 
DUA is funded by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, it 
side-steps the eligibility problem faced 
by self-employed workers under the 
regular state UI program. 
Te advantage of DUA over other 
modifcations to UI being considered, 
such as extended benefts, is that it 
assists workers who would otherwise 
not receive benefts, and it does so 
quickly—typically within two to three 
weeks of job loss. As a result, it is 
targeted to individuals whose work 
and incomes have been interrupted 
and who will likely require income for 
basics such as rent and utilities, car 
payments, and groceries. 
In short, DUA would target federal 
fnancial assistance to a large group 
of workers whose work and pay have 
ended as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic, but who are ineligible for 
UI benefts because of their self-
employment status. Te legislative 
authority exists, and the apparatus to 
run the program is ready to go. Only 
a presidential disaster declaration 
is needed to start what could now 
be the most benefcial single fscal 
policy action available to the federal 
government. 
References 
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On March 17, 2020, the Trump 
administration announced plans to 
send a payment of at least $1,000 to 
each household in the United States, 
with the goal of alleviating the negative 
economic efects of the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
What does research have to say 
about the likely impact of such 
payments? Previous administrations 
have used similar economic stimulus 
payments—also referred to as 
tax rebates—to counteract falling 
consumer demand. Tese tax rebates 
have been extensively evaluated by 
researchers. 
In 2008, the Bush administration 
implemented one-time tax rebates 
averaging about $1,000 per household 
to about 130 million low- and middle-
income families. A similar but less 
generous program was implemented 
in 2001. In both cases, the rebates were 
disbursed using a close-to-random 
schedule, so it is possible to isolate 
their causal efects on outcomes. 
What were these efects? Studies 
have shown that both the 2001 and
and how households are able to spend 
their payments. With people practicing 
social distancing and shops and 
restaurants closed, consumers might 
be constrained in their ability to spend, 
particularly on services, resulting in a 
diferent composition of spending, and 
possibly a lower level, than in either 
2001 or 2008. 
But even if the proposed rebates 
were not spent, as were the 2001 and 
2008 rebates, research suggests they 
might buy people some peace of 
mind. My research (here, here, and 
here) showed that the 2008 stimulus 
payments had a large efect on reducing 
feelings of worry and stress. Te fgure 
below illustrates the magnitude of these 
Figure 1  The Efect of Receiving Payment on Various Emotions 
10 
efects. And as consumer confdence 
plunges, measures to boost consumers’ 
emotional well-being may beneft 
economic activity in the longer run. 
Finally, it is important to ask 
whether a rebate that is dispersed to all 
households is the most efective way 
to spend on the order of $100 billion. 
Small service-oriented businesses face 
severe hardship due to the COVID-19 
outbreak, so a stimulus targeted to 
provide liquidity to these businesses
might be more efective. And for 
households facing job loss due to 
the pandemic, a one-time payment 
would be less efective than a program 
providing ongoing liquidity. One 
possibility is to activate the Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance program, 
which would expand the availability 
of unemployment insurance to self-
employed and other workers who 
otherwise would be ineligible for 
benefts. 































2008 rebates had a positive impact 
on household spending. In 2001, 
households spent two-thirds of their 
rebates in the quarter of payment and 
the quarter following payment, and 
in 2008, households spent up to 90 
percent of their rebates in the quarter 
of payment and the following quarter. 
Moreover, the 2008 rebates increased 
personal consumption expenditures 
by up to 2.3 percent in the quarter of 
payment, and by up to 1 percent in 
-50 
the following quarter. Tese are large 
efects. 
Worry* Stress* Anger Pain Sadness Enjoyment Happiness 
Are similar efects to be expected 
SOURCE: Lachowska (2017). 
NOTE: The estimates come from the last two columns of Table 5 in Lachowska (2015). * denotes that the change in 
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Additional Proposals 
Food Stamps and Additional Proposals Unemployment Compensation 
Shared-Work Programs Can Ease 
the Coronavirus’s Economic Impact 
Katharine Abraham and Susan N. Houseman 
Te COVID-19 outbreak is 
causing massive disruption to the U.S. 
economy, with one-ffh of workers 
already reporting losing hours or 
work because of the pandemic. In 
such situations, layofs are ofen seen 
as inevitable. But, unless a business 
has been forced to close, there’s a way 
to keep workers on the payroll and 
ease the pain of a downturn. It’s called 
“work-sharing,” and 26 states covering 
about 70 percent of the U.S. workforce 
ofer a work-sharing option in their 
unemployment insurance system. 
Te authors detail what states and the 
federal government should do now 
to ensure that employers can and will 
implement work-sharing in a Politico
opinion piece, “Te Smart Way to Save 
Jobs in the Time of Coronavirus.” 
Preserving Jobs Despite the 
Coronavirus: Encouraging 
“Labor Hoarding” 
Timothy J. Bartik 
Te coronavirus will inevitably have 
negative efects on economic output 
and jobs in the short run. But due to 
reduced consumer confdence and 
business confdence, this pandemic 
could also lead to a long and severe 
recession. Te loss of jobs for some 
individuals could seriously damage 
their long-run economic prospects. 
Bartik proposes providing 
government assistance to encourage 
“labor hoarding” by employers— 
maintaining payrolls even with 
decreased demand—to reduce the 
long-run damage from what may be 
a serious recession. Tis, a revised 
version of a 2009 proposal with John 
Bishop for a Job Creation Tax Credit, 
is meant to be a complement for other 
proposals to boost the economy, 
such as cash payments, reforming 
unemployment insurance, and work 
sharing. Read more. 
Stimulus Steps the U.S. Should 
Take to Reduce Regional Economic 
Damages from the COVID-19 
Recession 
Timothy J. Bartik, Brad Hershbein, Mark Muro, 
and Bryan A. Stuart 
In addition to responding to the 
public health needs, policymakers are 
debating how they can respond with 
creative new economic policies, which 
are now urgently needed. One strategy 
they should consider is to leverage a 
sizable surge of federal aid to state and 
local governments (now conspicuously 
absent from federal stimulus packages) 
to help counter the pandemic’s coming 
negative impacts on the hardest-hit 
regional economies. To help these 
places, the authors suggest three federal 
actions. Read more. 
Housing Policy Is Crucial to Stem 
the Coronavirus Fallout 
Lee Adams, Brian Asquith, and Evan Mast 
Many laid-of workers are in 
danger of becoming delinquent on 
rents or mortgages, putting them 
at risk for foreclosure and eviction. 
Helping people maintain housing 
stability is even more important than 
normal, as public health ofcials 
urge the public to stay at home in 
order to quash transmission of the 
coronavirus. Te authors highlight 
fve areas where policymakers should 
quickly act in order to address both 
current and future problems in the 
housing market. Te proposed policies 
are relatively simple to implement 
but could have wide and immediate 
economic and public health benefts. 
Read more. 
in the COVID-19 Crisis 
Christopher J. O’Leary 
Te Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act (CARES 
Act) signifcantly increased access 
and benefts for Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) and the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
previously known as food stamps. 
Tese two programs responded quickly 
during the Great Recession to become 
the most important strands in the 
social safety net. Many adults received 
benefts from one or both programs 
during the crisis. However, features of 
the massive federal fscal stimulus in 
the CARES Act suggest the patterns of 
SNAP and UI program use might difer 
from the Great Recession. Read more. 
Fiscal Freefall for State and Local 
Governments: The Crisis We Are 
Not (Yet) Addressing 
Timothy Bartik, Michelle Miller-Adams, and 
John Austin 
Te authors call on Congress to 
provide substantial state and local 
aid—at least $250 billion for states 
alone—in order to mitigate the long-
term consequences of the current 
COVID-19-induced economic crisis. 
Furthermore, they describe the 
importance of that aid being targeted at 
the hardest-hit regions. Read more. 
Congress CARES But Private 
Student Loan Debt Remains 
Blind Spot in the COVID-19 
Relief Package 
Daniel A. Collier, Chris Marsicano, and 
Dan Fitzpatrick 
Te CARES Act provides federal 
student loan debt relief but has a 
blind spot for borrowers with private 
student loans. Low-income, racial 
minority, and frst-generation students 
disproportionately borrow from private 
lenders. Te complete lack of private 
student loan debt relief in the CARES 
6 
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Act works against its great intentions— 
to support Americans in need as 
COVID-19 pushes the country into 
economic crisis. Te authors believe 
that Congress should take up private 
student loan relief, treating privately 
funded student loan debt the same as 
federally funded student loan debt. 
Read more. 
As this crisis unfolds, Upjohn staf 
will continue posting new policy 
proposals to address COVID-19-
related issues and responding to 
the latest data provided by the 
Department of Labor. Keep up by 
visiting our website or by following 
us on Twitter (see links in the blue 
box below). 
Connect with us 
New! 2020–2021 
Publications Catalog 
With our new catalog, the 
Upjohn Press now ofers over 200 
books—from its backlist along 
with selected frontlist titles and 
its WEfocus books—as free PDF 
downloads. Tis provides anyone 
unlimited access to decades’ worth 
of leading scholarship on a wide 
range of labor-related issues. Scroll 
through this online version and 
fnd links to all our books dating 
back to 1980. Or, you can visit the 
Institute’s digital repository for a 
list of all available titles at https:// 
research.upjohn.org/openaccess/. 
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